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In this paper, we empirically assess how information cost, as one component of 
trade costs,  impacts  the  decision  of an individual firm to  export.  Firm-level data 
measuring  the  difficulty of obtaining information about  technical regulations in  the 
European Union (EU) and the United States is used as a proxy for information cost to 
evaluate reduction in firm incentives to export. Results suggest that information cost 
significantly reduces the likelihood of exporting to these two destinations. Negative 
impacts are relatively larger for a firm exporting to the United States than to the EU. 
Key words: information cost, trade costs, non-tariff, technical barriers to trade, probit 
JEL classification: F14, L25 
 
1. Introduction   
Trade costs are broadly defined to include items that limit firm exports based 
on all costs associated with product delivery to the final user. They include both tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. As  tariffs  are reduced through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements,  concern  over  the  substitution of non-tariff  trade  barriers (NTBs)  has 
increased. NTBs contribute both a growing amount and a growing share to the 
aggregate trade costs facing potential exporters. While a multitude of policies and 
regulations are included within the broad category of non-tariff barriers, an important - 
and often overlooked - category is information costs and its impact on exports.   2 
 
For example, some literature has been developed  to  identify and estimate 
compliance and implementation costs associated with technical barriers to trade (TBT), 
a particularly challenging category in NTBs.    However, results are largely limited to 
country case studies given the disparate nature of these barriers and often ambiguous 
economic impacts (see for example, Paarlberg and Lee, 1998; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen, 
2004; Peterson and Orden, 2008; Disdier, Fontagne and Mimouni,2006; Maskus, Otsuki 
and Wilson, 2001).Increased compliance costs are obvious consequences from technical 
barriers but information costs, associated with information collection and research on 
relevant regulations and standards, the application of regulations and standards to the 
products  under consideration  of export,  and  even  where to obtain the necessary 
information, are not considered and excluded from this line of research. Compliance 
costs are assumed to be known and certain without collecting information; they are 
normally  specified as fixed cost to  establish new processes or procedures  and/or 
recurring expenses to implement requirements upon exporting.   
Yet clearly there is some learning, or information gathering, that occurs. Using 
nine-year (1981-1989) firm-level panel data from the Colombian manufacturing sector, 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) provide empirical evidence that a firm with prior experience 
is up to 60 percent more likely to export than a firm that has never exported. Employing 
a similar dynamic discrete choice model, Bernard and Jenson (2001) found that entry 
costs to foreign markets are substantial for U.S. manufacturing firms, and firms are 
increasingly likely to export in consecutive years. Recently Das, Roberts and Tybout 
(2007) go beyond previous reduced-form analysis and are able to quantify fixed entry 3 
 
costs for three Colombian manufacturing industries (basic chemicals, leather products, 
and knitted fabrics) by estimating a structural model. Results indicate average entry 
costs to foreign markets are similar across the three sectors between 1981 and 1991, but 
are  lower  for large producers (e.g.  $402,000 for knitting mills) relative to small 
producers (e.g. $412,000 for knitting mills).A  2001  OECD  report,  based on survey 
results from 55 firms in three industries (terminal telecommunications equipment, dairy 
products, and automotive components), found many firms had difficulty in assessing ex 
ante  the costs of compliance, and small firms relied more on external information 
sources than did large firms. For small and medium-sized firms with an expectation of 
limited export volume, information cost is potentially an insurmountable burden.   
Information costs are the monetary equivalent of firm efforts and investments 
to research and understand regulations and standards imposed by a potential foreign 
market. These costs must be undertaken by a firm to evaluate potential competitiveness 
and assess their own ability to enter a given market. Difficulties in accessing 
information about regulations, exporting procedures, or compliance could limit a firm’s 
export competitiveness well beyond the content of regulation and standards themselves. 
Even though trade policies are sometimes publically accessible through official web 
sites, it is not an easy or costless task for firms to go through the tedious, and often 
obscure, documentation to extract the specific information they need. The problem is 
exacerbated for smaller and mid-sized firms. 
In 2004, ad-valorem tax equivalent trade costs for industrialized countries were 
estimated to be 170 percent  of producer price  (Anderson and van  Wincoop, 2004). 4 
 
Included are impacts from tariffs (less than five percent), nontariff barriers (eight 
percent), and information costs (six percent), which implies these three sources were 
almost equal impediments to trade on an aggregated basis. Once information costs are 
undertaken, they are considered sunk costs whether or not the tariff or other non-tariff 
barriers are prohibitive. 
In response to empirical evidence, Melitz (2003) developed a dynamic trade 
model with heterogeneous firms to examine the effect of export market entry costs on 
different types of firms. Only more productive firms enter export markets while less 
productive firms are confined to domestic market. Wei and Thornsbury (2011) extended 
the Melitz model to analyze how individual firms may reduce or eliminate the 
uncertainty of compliance costs by paying for the information cost prior to making 
decisions to export. Our model indicates that in the presence of uncertain compliance 
costs and non-zero information cost, i) the number of exporting firms may be reduced 
since  some  firms  capable  of  exporting  are trapped within the  domestic market; ii) 
average profits and productivity differences between exporting and non-exporting firms 
are smaller. 
In this paper, we focus on empirically testing the impacts of information cost 
on exporter  decisions  using a firm-level data  set  collected by the World Bank. In 
particular, we assess the relationship between difficulty in obtaining information about 
EU and U.S. technical regulations  and  firm-level  exports to those destinations.  We 
separate, and empirically test, the effect of information cost from regulatory compliance 
cost and other trade costs. Specific markets are considered independently while previous 5 
 
firm-level  empirical studies  on export decisions  do  not distinguish exporting 
destinations (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jenson, 2001; Das, Roberts, and 
Tybout, 2007; Blanes-Cristóbal et al., 2008; Özler, Taymaz, Yılmaz, 2008). Differences 
by market are  of particular interest  with respect to technical regulations which are 
formulated given conditions in specific exporting and importing countries (Thornsbury, 
Roberts, and Orden, 2004).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the data set used in our empirical estimation and explains our focus on the EU and the 
United States.  The  empirical model is  described  in Section 3  and  we present our 
estimation results in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude. 
2. Data 
The primary dataset utilized for this study is the World Bank Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) survey results. While the survey was not initially designed to identify 
information cost, it allows empirical testing of information cost impacts. The original 
purpose was to investigate the impact of technical regulations and standards in major 
markets  (EU,  U.S., Canada, Japan,  and Australia), therefore  firms included in this 
survey are either firms currently involved in exporting, or non-exporting firms with 
potential interest in exporting. Although there is some information on whether or not a 
firm is exporting to countries other than these five markets, separate identification is not 
possible.
1
                                                  
 
1 Countries other than the major five markets are recorded as other exporting destinations (1, 2, 3, etc.) without the 
names of the country being specified or consistent categorization applied. 
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The data, collected between 2001 and 2002, covers 689 firms over 25 
industries in 17 developing countries  from five different world  regions.  Detailed 
industrial and geographical distributions of the surveyed firms are presented in Table 1. 
Information on firm characteristics, financial status, and experience in compliance with 
regulations is reported primarily as count data. Although the survey was intended to 
cover both currently exporting and non-exporting firms, the number of firms involved in 
exporting to at least one destination is 628 (91 percent of the sample) while only 47 
firms (about 7  percent) are not exporting.  Separation of observations by export 
destination allows empirical testing. We focus our analysis on the two largest export 
markets, the EU and the United States, as they are the most important trade partners for 
all countries included in the survey. Among all surveyed firms 231 firms out of 630 (37 
percent) are exporting only to the EU, 56 firms (9 percent) are exporting only to the 
United States, 227 firms (36 percent) export to both destinations, and the remaining 116 
firms (18 percent) export to neither of these two destinations.   
The share of exports to the EU is the greatest from countries in our sample 
except  from Latin America and Caribbean  countries.  Among  the  other  non-East 
European countries, the EU is listed as one of the top five trading partners for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural products. Meanwhile, the share of exports  to  the 
United States is also large. The United States is a major trading partner in  both 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, for Argentina, Chile, Honduras, India, Kenya, 
South Africa and Uganda; a major trading partner in agricultural sectors for Senegal and 
Panama; and a major trading partner in non-agricultural sectors for Pakistan, Nigeria 7 
 
and Jordan. Missing data in terms of firm-level response to some of the key questions 
regarding  exports to Canada, Japan and Australia  prohibit  modeling  these export 
destinations separately.   
The number of firms responding to the key question regarding whether it is 
difficult or not to obtain information on standards and regulations for the EU and United 
States is 475 and 331 respectively, but drops to around 180 (less than 27 percent of the 
total sampled firms) for the other three major markets. Among 281 respondents who 
answered the question for both the EU and the United States, 206 firms (more than 73 
percent) reported obtaining information without difficulty for both destinations and 46 
firms (16 percent) reported obtaining information with difficulty for both destinations.     
3. Empirical Model and Variable Description   
Following the approach of Melitz, a firm will export to a particular destination 
as long as productivity is greater than a cut-off productivity level. Profit typically serves 
as an empirical measure of productivity.
2
i i i X y ε β + =
∗
 We use a reduced form approach to test for 
impact of information cost on firm level export decisions since our data set lacks price 
and quantity information. The firms in our data set represent an underlying population 
that is interested in exporting (either currently exporting or wishing to export but not 
able to).  To parameterize the model, we define   where 
∗
i y is a latent 
variable representing the expected future profit from  exporting,  i X is a vector of 
                                                  
 
2 Ideally with firm-level price and quantity data available, we would specify a firm’s profit as a function of foreign 
price, domestic price, exchange rate, tariff rate, compliance cost, transportation cost, etc. Then we could estimate a 
structural form of the firm’s willingness to pay, as an approximization of the upper bound on fixed information cost 
(e.g. Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007). 
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observable firm characteristics, and  i ε   is the error term. The firm export decision can 
be modeled as a binary-choice decision, 













To test the hypothesis that information cost imposes an initial barrier to the 
decision of an individual firm to export, we estimate the probit model   
] 0 _ [ 1 _ 1 0 > + + ⋅ + = i i i i X Y INFO Y EXP ε δ β β ,    i ε ~normal(0,1), 
where,  i Y EXP_   is a dummy variable corresponding to two exporting destinations: EU 
and the United States. For instance,  i EU EXP_ =1 if individual firm i exports to EU and 
0 otherwise. Similarly,  i USA EXP_ =1 if individual firm i exports to the United States 
and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable is the dummy variable i Y INFO_ , 
indicating whether or not it is difficult for an individual firm i to obtain information 
about trade regulations in the EU or the U.S.
  
The vector of control variables, X, includes firm characteristics, compliance 
cost, tariff rate, trade restriction index and distance measures. Variables such as years of 
establishment (HISTORY), firm ownership (OWNER_TYPE) and industry (INDUSTRY) 
are used to control for basic firm characteristics. Number  of  full-time  employees 
(LABOR) is used to measure firm size. Firm profit (PROFIT) is calculated as the sales 
value minus two production costs; input expenditure on raw materials and total payroll. 
Three dummy variables, whether a firm invested in additional plant or equipment (EQP), 
in one-time product redesign (REDESIGN), and in product re-design for each export 
destination (MKT_REDESIGN), are included to partition the effect of compliance and 9 
 
implementation costs.   
A simple average tariff rate (TARIFF) on products aggregated to agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors for each pair-wise country is included as an independent 
variable.
3 As a measure of non-tariff barriers, an overall trade restriction index (OTRI)
4
In cross-section data analysis, an inevitable problem is endogeneity. For the 
key independent information variables  in our empirical analysis  (INFO_EU, 
INFO_USA), there may be unobserved heterogeneity in the error term affecting both the 
difficulty in obtaining information and the probability of exporting at firm level. For 
instance, profitable firms are willing to pay more to collect information and thus are 
more likely to be involved in export markets. Failing to account for endogeneity of the 
information variable may cause an upward bias of the impact of information cost on 
probability of exporting. With only cross section data and no valid instrument variable 
 
is included. The index is an ad-valorem price equivalent of NTBs, including price and 
quantity control measures, technical measures, as well as monopolistic measures and 
agricultural domestic support. Distance between exporting country and destination 
market controls for transportation cost, measured by the surface distance from exporting 
firm’s capital city to the nearest ports in the destination country. 
                                                  
 
3 “Preferential Tariffs of Major sectors in OECD Markets by Exporter in 2005” by Francis K. T. Ng, World Bank. 
Since country specific tariff rates for three East European Countries, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland are not 
included, we use an average tariff rate of EU and USA for these three countries obtained in “Global Monitoring 
Report 2008---Overall Restriction Indices” as an approximation. Accession date for Bulgaria, Czech Republic and 
Poland are January 2007, May 2004 and May 2004 respectively. Therefore, these countries were non-EU member 
states when the data was collected. 
4 “Global Monitoring Report 2008---Overall Restriction Indices” by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, World Bank. While 
the non-tariff measure (OTRI) is an estimated index that bundles multiple forms of trade restrictions into one measure, 
it does capture the numerous forms of non-tariff barriers that are imposed. 10 
 
available, we select independent variables to control.
5
4. Results and Discussion 
 If unobserved heterogeneity is 
coming systematically from region or country level the distance variable, computed at 
country level, will  control  for  this effect.  The  more usual case is unobserved 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics. As firms with higher productivity self-select into 
export markets, then measures of profit  and other firm characteristics,  potentially 
affecting willingness-to-pay for information, are used as controls.     
Estimation results from three specifications of the empirical probit model are 
summarized in Table 3. Columns EU(1) and US(1) summarize results for the baseline 
specification with independent export decisions. The probit model is run separately for 
EU and the United States where information costs for only that destination are included. 
The underlying assumption (later relaxed in two alternative estimation methods) is that 
the  decision  to  export to the  EU, as well as the difficulty in obtaining relevant 
information on EU export market is not related to the decision to export to the United 
States and vice versa. Coefficients on the information variable for both the EU and U.S. 
are statistically significant at ten-percent and five-percent level respectively. Average 
partial effects
6
                                                  
 
5 Ideally, we would deal with this problem by fixed effect or first difference methods if we have panel data and if we 
are willing to assume unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant.    We believe this is better than a weak instrument 
or a slightly endogenous instrument variable. 
  indicate  that  difficulty of obtaining information about  technical 
regulations  significantly reduces the probability of a firm exporting to  EU by  5.4 
percentage points and to the United States by 12 percentage points. Information cost 
imposes relatively larger negative impact on firms exporting to the United States.   
6 We calculate the marginal effect for each individual firm and then average across sample size. 11 
 
Provided that the EU and the United States  are  either  competing  or 
complimentary export destinations, a firm’s decision to export to the EU will inevitably 
be affected by difficulty in obtaining relevant information about U.S. export regulations. 
Likewise, a firm’s decision to export to the United States will be affected by difficulty 
in obtaining information on EU export regulations. Hence we relax the assumption of 
independence by first including both information cost variables in the right hand side 
and estimate the following specification separately for EU and the United States.   
] 0 _ _ [ 1 _ 2 1 0 > + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = i i i i i u X USA INFO EU INFO Y EXP δ β β β ,  i ε ~normal(0,1),   
where  i Y   corresponds to the EU and the United States.   
  Results are presented in columns EU(2) and US(2). For the EU equation, after 
controlling for INFO_USA, difficulty of obtaining information on technical regulations 
in the EU reduces the probability of a firm exporting to EU by 10 percentage points, 
almost double the effect without controlling for INFO_USA. In contrast, in the U.S. 
equation coefficients of INFO_EU  and  INFO_USA  are not individually statistically 
significant, but jointly significant at 10 percent level (withχ
2
=5.38). Average partial 
effects indicate that difficulty of obtaining information on technical regulations in the 
U.S.  only  reduces  the probability of a firm exporting to the United States by 0.1 
percentage points, while difficulty of obtaining information on technical regulations in 
the EU reduces  the probability of a firm exporting to the United States by 14.7 
percentage points. The overwhelmed negative effect of INFO_EU in the U.S. equation 
is somehow contradicting to what we expect to observe: if EU and the U.S. are two 
competing markets, as the difficulty of obtaining information on technical regulations in 12 
 
EU increases, the probability of a firm exporting to the U.S. should be increased rather 
than decreased if everything else are the same. On the other hand, if EU and the U.S. are 
two complimentary markets, the negative effects of INFO_EU and INFO_USA should 
be quite similar.   
To understand why the U.S. export decision equation behaves so differently 
from the EU equation, we decompose firms in the U.S. equation by cross tabulating 
EXP_USA  and  INFO_USA,  EXP_USA  and  INFO_EU,  INFO_USA  and  INFO_EU. 
Approximately 84% of the firms exporting to the United States which report difficulty 
of obtaining information about the USA also report difficulty of obtaining information 
about EU. Due to this multi-collinearity problem,
7
A second method to relax the assumption that export decisions to individual 
countries are independent is to estimate the following bivariate probit model and test the 
null hypothesis that
 the effect of INFO_USA vanishes 
when INFO_EU is included in the U.S. equation. On the other hand, we are able to 
identify and partition out the effect of INFO_EU in the EU case after controlling for 
INFO_USA because there is enough variation in firms exporting to EU.   
0 = ρ . 
 
] 0 _ [ 1 _
] 0 _ [ 1 _
1 0
1 0
> + + ⋅ + =
> + + ⋅ + =
i i i i
i i i i
v X USA INFO USA EXP
u X EU INFO EU EXP
δ β β
δ β β
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7 Estimation results from US equation exhibit symptoms of multi-collinearity: individual coefficient of INFO_EU and 
INFO_USA is not significant, but the joint test is significant at 10% level. 
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Under this specification (results reported in columns EU(3) and US(3)), the 
estimated  coefficient  on  INFO_EU  is not statistically significant, but the estimated 
coefficient  on  INFO_USA  remains significant at 10%. The null hypothesis of 
independence ( 0 = ρ ) is rejected at 1% significance level, again indicating that export 
decisions to different destinations are related. Average partial affect shows difficulty of 
obtaining information about  technical regulations reduces  the probability of a firm 
exporting to the United States by 11.5 percentage points.   
In contrast to information cost, it seems compliance costs are not as important 
in reducing the probability that a firm will export. The coefficients of compliance costs 
are not individually  statistically significant across all three  probit specifications for 
either  the EU or  the United States.
8
In contrast to empirical results from earlier studies of trade patterns where 
information cost is not considered, our results find lower relative impacts from tariffs, 
when considered separately, as a major determinant of firm decisions to restrict exports. 
The largest average partial effect of tariff rate (in EU(2)) reduces the probability of a 
firm exporting to the EU by approximately four percentage points, which is smaller than 
  This  result  supports  the  assumption  that  an 
individual firm makes export decisions after collecting information, but prior to pay the 
compliance costs. Once the uncertainty of the compliance costs is eliminated by paying 
the information cost, compliance costs will be no longer a hurdle for firms capable to 
export (see Wei and Thornsbury, 2011 for theoretical development of this assumption).     
                                                  
 
8 Neither the joint test for the three compliance cost variables (EQP, REDESIGN, and MKT_DESIGN) is significant at 
10% level. See Table 3 notes. 14 
 
the impact caused by information cost. The coefficient on the non-tariff measure (OTRI) 
for the EU is positive and statistically significant with a small percentage impact. In 
case of the United States, neither the estimated coefficients for tariff rate,  nontariff 
index, nor the joint tests are significant in the probit specifications.     
These results are not surprising and are consistent with our hypothesis that in 
fact it is the information cost rather than tariff and nontariff barriers (such as compliance 
and implementation costs) that creates the initial hurdle and hinders the decision to 
export. Regulations and standards in a foreign market might be less restrictive than 
expected once firms pay the information costs. The existence of certain regulations and 
standards such as labeling or content requirements may actually increase the probability 
of export if a firm realizes these requirements are already met after the information costs 
are undertaken, like the EU results we observe in our sample.   
We also report results from linear probability models (LPM) and seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) which we treat as benchmark cases and use for the purpose 
of comparison (Table 3). Average partial effects of INFO_EU and INFO_USA from 
each probit specification are directly comparable with coefficients from its 
corresponding linear probability model specifications (from EU(4) to US(6)), where 
coefficients per se indicate partial effects. Another reason for us to compare the partial 
average effects of different probit specifications with linear probability model 
specifications is due to the restrictiveness of the standard normal distribution 
assumption for the error term of the probit model. In addition, the linear probability 
model specifications can always serve as the benchmark cases for a robustness check. 15 
 
In the LPM results EU(4) and USA(4), estimated coefficients indicate the 
difficulty of obtaining information on standards and regulations causes 5.7 percentage 
points and 12.1 percentage points reduction in probability of exporting to EU and the 
United States respectively. In SUR regression (EU(6) and US(6)), difficulty of obtaining 
information  on standards and regulations causes 5.7  percentage points and 13.2 
percentage points reduction in probability of exporting to EU and the United States 
respectively. These effects are quite close to the average partial effects calculated from 
the probit model with single information variable (EU(1) and US(1)) and the biprobit 
model (EU(3) and US(3)). Although the binary variable for information cost is only a 
proxy and thus not able to fully capture the entire information cost faced by a firm, a 
significant relationship with export decisions is clearly reflected for firms exporting to 
both destinations.
9
In addition, regression results illustrate differences between firms exporting to 
EU and the United States in terms of trade pattern. Distance matters for firms exporting 
to the EU, but not to the United States.
   
10
                                                  
 
9 Since we have information on share exported to the EU and the United State, we tried fractional response logit 
model using export share as dependent variable. However, we are not able to extract more useful information because 
of a large fraction of zeros in the information cost variable (around 75% of firms report no difficulty in obtaining 
information for either country). 
 Results for firm characteristics do not identify 
a clear relationship with export decisions. In contrast to Blanes-Cristóbal et al. (2008) 
which found no significant effect of firms’ years of establishment (HISTORY) on export 
decision, we find mixed results. Firm age matters for firms exporting to the EU, but not 
to the United States. Although firm profit is found to be statistically significant for firms 
10 Although individual coefficients of distance variables are not significant for the individual destinations, the joint 
test is significant for the EU but not for the United States.   16 
 
exporting to the EU, it is not economically significant across specifications for both EU 
and the United States. In addition, number of employees, as another key indicator of 
firm size is neither statistically nor economically  significant in both cases across 
different specifications. This may be attributable to the fact that little variation is 
observed in firm size since the data set was originally designed by the World Bank to 
focus on small and mid-sized firms: more than 67 percent of the sampled firms have 
less than 150 employees. This result is supported by the finding in Özler et al (2008) 
that the probability of exporting increases as size of plants moving from small plants 
(25-49 employees) to large plants (250+ employees) irrespective of past export 
experience. In other words, plant sizes matters more when the plant is large enough.   
5. Conclusion   
Using firm level data, we provide empirical evidence on how information cost 
limits individual firms from participating in two separate export markets. Although the 
magnitudes of information cost are different for EU and the United States, they are 
consistently shown to have a significant negative impact on individual firm decisions to 
export  to  both destinations.  Our empirical results show that ceteris paribus,  rising 
information costs significantly reduce the probability that a firm will export either to the 
EU or to the United States, creating an initial hurdle to trade beyond compliance costs 
associated with tariff and other non-tariff barriers. Our results contribute to tangible 
empirical estimation of impacts from trade costs by disentangling relative information 
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Table 1. Industrial and Geographical Distribution of Sampled Firms 
 
Industry 
Exporting Region (No. of firms) 









Raw Agricultural Products  5                                             19  2  6  52  84 
Meat Products  2                                            12  0  1  10  25 
Electrical and electrical equipment  20                                              1  1  11  2  35 
Fabricated metal  4                                     1  1  7    10  23 
Industrial machinery and equipment  2                                               2  0  8  5  17 
Industrial or agricultural chemical  19                                               7  7  2  8  43 
Instruments, photographic, optical  1                                                1  0  2  0  4 
Leather and leather products  2                                                 0  1  18  2  23 
Paper and allied products  0                                              2  0  0  3  5 
Printing and publishing products  0                                               1  0  1  1  3 
Processed food and tobacco  13                                   23  13          11  22  82 
Rubber and plastic products  0                                            10  6  3  9  28 
Telecommunications and terminal equip  4                                                  0  0  1  1  6 
Textiles and apparel  26                                          7  14  110  12  169 
Transportation equipment, auto parts  15                                         4  1    6  8  34 
Lumber, wood and furniture  4                                               5  1  0  4  14 
Construction and construction relate  0                                               1  0  1  2  4 
Primary metal and metallic ores  1                                                 1  2  0  8  12 
Petroleum and other nonmetallic mine  0                                               0  6  0  8  14 
Miscellaneous manufactured commodity  0                                                0  2  30  7  39 
Drug and liquor  1                                             6  0  0  4  11 
Material  2                                       1  0  1  0  4 
Transportation and mailing service  0                                         0  0  1  2    3 
Other services  0                                      2  0  0    2  4 
Other  0                                               0  1  0  2  3 
Total  121                                 106  58  220  184  689 Table 2.    Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Name  Definition  No. of Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
EXP_EU  1 if firm exports to EU, 0 otherwise.  630  0.727  0.446  0  1 
EXP_USA  1 if firm exports to US, 0 otherwise.  630  0.449  0.498  0  1 
INFO_EU  Difficulty in obtaining regulation information in EU,1=yes, 0 
otherwise 
475  0.204  0.404  0  1 
INFO_USA  Difficulty in obtaining regulation information in US, 1=yes, 0 
otherwise 
331  0.208  0.407  0  1 
INDUSTRY  Industry code  689  10.546  6.167  1  25 
HISTORY  years since the firm is established  646  24.180  24.328  1  305 
TARIFF_EU (%)  EU tariff rate  672  0.578  1.250  0  6.87 
TARIFF_USA (%)  US tariff rate  643  0.689  1.133  0  8.97 
OTRI_EU (%)  EU overall trade restriction index  671  11.140  17.596  0  42.8 
OTRI_USA (%)  US overall trade restriction index  674  6.962  4.596  4.2  14.6 
OWNER_TYPE  Type of ownership    590  1.888  1.678  1  8 
PROFIT  Sales net input expenditure on raw materials and total payroll (in 
2001 US million dollars) 
552    4.424    14.662    -32.319  145.061 
LABOR  Number of full-time monthly workers  603      257.12  749.96  1  9500 
EQP  investment in additional plant or equipment  624                    0.423  0.494  0  1 
REDESIGN  Investment in product re-design for each export market  623  0.283  0.451  0  1 
MKT_REDESIGN  Investment in one-time product re-design  623  0.340  0.474  0  1 
LOG(DIS_EU)  Logarithm of distance between EU and exporting country  689  8.501  0.774  6.564  9.393 
( ) EU DIS LOG _
2   Squared logarithm of distance between EU and exporting country  689  72.856  12.413  43.086  88.231 
LOG(DIS_USA)  Logarithm of distance between US and exporting country  689  9.113  0.417  7.487  9.487 
( ) USA DIS LOG _
2   Squared logarithm of distance between US and exporting country  689  83.221  7.201  56.060  90.006 
         Table 3: Coefficients of Effects of Information Cost on Firm Export Decisions   
  Independent Export Decisions    Interacted Export Decision  Independent Export Decisions  Interacted Export Decision 
Control Variables 
Probit Model  Probit Model  Biprobit Model  LPM  LPM  SUR 
EU(1)  US(1)  EU(2)  US(2)  EU(3)  US(3)  EU(4)  US(4)  EU(5)  US(5)  EU(6)  US(6) 
INFO_EU  -0.822 * 
(0.456)   






---  -0.057* 
(0.032) 













---  -0.462* 
(0.261) 






---  -0.132** 
(0.062) 
INDUSTRY  0.061 ** 























HISTORY  0.016** 















































OTRI  0.040** 
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PROFIT  0.000* 































































































MKT_DESIGN  0.165 
(0.382) 






















LOG(DIS_EU)  11.030 
(13.169) 
---  5.433 
(28.183) 
---  3.554 
(13.207) 
---  1.138*** 
(0.022) 
---  1.479*** 
(0.519) 
---  0.727 
(0.472) 
--- 
( ) EU DIS LOG _
2   -0.805 
(0.763) 
---  -0.482 
(1.590) 
---  -0.329 
(0.768) 
---  -0.076*** 
(0.022) 
---  -0.098*** 
(0.033) 
---  -0.050* 
(0.029) 
--- 
LOG(DIS_USA)  ---    -6.320 
(7.500) 
---  -2.866 
(8.157) 
---  -2.989 
(8.490) 
---  -1.458 
(1.830) 
---  -0.515 
(2.284) 
---  0.105 
(1.758) 
( ) USA DIS LOG _
2   ---  0.385 
(0.439) 
---  0.199 
(0.478) 
---  0.195 
(0.495) 
---  0.089 
(0.107) 
---  0.039 
(0.132) 
---  -0.002 
(0.103) 
No. of Observations  308  208  178  175  174  174  308  208  178  175  190  190 22 
 
 
Notes:  1. Constant is suppressed in all specifications.   
2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses except for SUR regression results (built-in STATA command only reports non-robust standard error).   
3. “*”, “**” and “***” represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
4. All joint test results reported here are concerning probit model specifications. Linear probability model results are reported in the table as benchmark cases for 
comparison (all joint test results for linear probability models are available from authors upon request). 
F-static for the joint significance of INFO_EU and INFO_USA is significant at 10% in specification US(2) with chi2=5.38. 
F-static for the joint significance of INFO_EU and INFO_USA is not significant at 10% in the specification of EU(3) and US(3).   
      F-static for the joint significance of LOG(DIS_EU) , ( ) EU DIS LOG _
2 is significant at 1% for specification EU(1), EU (2) and EU(3).   
F-static for the joint significance of LOG(DIS_USA) , ( ) USA DIS LOG _
2 is not significant at 10% for specification USA(1), USA(2) and USA(3). 
      F-static for the joint significant of three compliance cost variables (EQP, REDESIGN, and MKT_DESIGN) is not significant at 10% across all probit specifications for      
both EU and the United States. 
      F-static for the joint significance of TARIFF and OTRI is not significant at 10% for specification USA(1),USA(2) and USA(3). 
 
 
 
 